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ANALOGY AND NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF 
A BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
 
Lee McConnell* 
 
Abstract: In light of a recent shift in dialogue to hard law standards in the 
domain of business and human rights, this article provides an in-depth 
examination of the viability of a business and human rights treaty. It seeks to 
advance a valid theoretical model for a treaty that directly addresses non-State 
actors, explores the allocation of responsibility among multiple duty-bearers, 
and contemplates the scope, content, and enforcement of the potential 
obligations. By supplementing this analysis with analogies drawn from existing 
treaty regimes, the article aims to contribute positively to the normative 
development of international law in the field. 
 
Keywords: Non-State Actors, Business and Human Rights, International Human 
Rights, International Law-making, Legal Theory, Pure Theory of Law, Formalism, 
Legal Analogy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The transnational operations of business actors often give rise to adverse human 
rights impacts. In light of international phenomena such as economic 
globalization, the privatization of warfare and other traditionally governmental 
functions, non-State actors now exert significant influence on public affairs. By 
contrast, State power has dramatically declined over the course of the last 
century, leading to a position of relative corporate impunity. Many developing 
States are incapable of effectively safeguarding the human rights of their 
populations due to weak governmental and judicial infrastructures or 
corruption. Such States may also demonstrate an unwillingness to ensure 
adherence to human rights at the domestic level due to fears that such activity 
might stem the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Western States, which 
may be capable of providing procedurally fairer avenues to domestic redress for 
victims of corporate negligence, have proven reluctant to hear cases concerning 
extraterritorial conduct, and the complex corporate structures established by 
many business actors often hinder the success of domestic litigation.  
Nonetheless, States remain the primary addressees of international 
human rights obligations. The dominant method of advancing the business and 
human rights agenda at the international level has been via non-judicially 
enforceable soft-law initiatives such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
                                                        
* The author would like to express thanks to Rhona Smith, David McGrogan, Rebecca Moosavian, 
Conall Mallory, Adam Ramshaw, and the participants at the International Law Association 
(British Branch) Spring Conference 2016 for their constructive comments during earlier stages of 
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and Human Rights 2011 (UNGPs), the efficacy of which have been called into 
doubt.1 Given the failings of regulatory regimes at both the international and 
domestic levels, the question has arisen as to whether non-State actors ought to 
be directly subject to international human rights standards.2 This matter has 
been subject to significant debate among scholars3 and States alike, stimulated in 
part by the submissions of Ecuador at the 24th session of the Human Rights 
Council in 2013, when a directly binding business and human rights treaty was 
first tabled.4 This was followed in June 2014 by the adoption of a resolution 
establishing the need for further elaboration of a legally binding treaty directly 
addressing business actors,5 and the establishment of a dedicated Open-Ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group that met for the first time in July 2015.6 
                                                        
1 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) HR/PUB/11/04; S Little & L Snider, ǮExamining the Ruggie Report: Can Voluntary Guidelines Tame Global Capitalism?ǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 
21 Crit Crim 177-92. 
2 P Simons, Ǯ)nternational Lawǯs )nvisible (and and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of (uman Rightsǯ ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ͵ J (um Rts & Environ 5-43; S Joseph, ǮTaming the 
Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rightsǯ ȋͳͻͻͻȌ Ͷ͸ Neth )ntǯl L Rev ͳ͹Ͷ; O De 
Schutter, ǮThe Challenge of )mposing (uman Rights on Corporate Actorsǯ in O De Schutter (ed), 
Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2006) 17-22; A Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP, 2006) 83; M Karavias, Corporate Obligations Under 
International Law (OUP, 2013); A Clapham, Ǯ(uman Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situationsǯ ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ ͺͺ )ntǯl Rev Red Cross ͷʹ͵; M Noortmann & C Ryngaert (eds) Non-
State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Ashgate, 2010); Y 
Ronon, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors, (20ͳ͵Ȍ Ͷ͸ Cornell )ntǯl LJ ʹʹ-5. 
3 O De Schutter, ǮTowards a New Treaty on Business and (uman Rightsǯ ȋʹͲͳͷȌ 1 Business & 
Hum Rts J 41; D Bilchitz, ǮThe Necessity for a Business and (uman Rights Treatyǯ ȋ͵Ͳ November 
2014) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2562760> accessed 21 April 2016; 
F Mégret, ǮWould a Treaty be all it is made up to be?ǯ (4 February 2015) 
<http://jamesgstewart.com/would-a-treaty-be-all-it-is-made-up-to-be/> accessed 21 April 
2016; J Ruggie, ǮGet Real or Weǯll Get Nothing: Reflections on the First Session of the )ntergovernmental Working Group on a Business and (uman Rights Treatyǯ <http://business-
humanrights.org/en/get-real-or-well-get-nothing-reflections-on-the-first-session-of-the-
intergovernmental-working-group-on-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty> accessed 21 April ʹͲͳ͸; O(C(R, ǮUN Expert calls for binding Human Rights Treaty for Corporationsǯ (18 June 
2015) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16097> 
accessed 21 April 2016; S Deva, ǮScope of the Legally Binding )nstrument to Address (uman Rights Violations Related to Business Activitiesǯ (ESCR-Net & FIDH Treaty Initiative) 
<https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/scope_of_treaty.pdf> accessed 21 April 2016. 
4 (uman Rights Council ǮRepublic of Ecuador: Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 
24rd Session of the HRC, Transnational Corporations and (uman Rightsǯ ȋGeneva, September 
2013) <http://business-humanrights.org/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-
binding.pdf> accessed 21 April 2016. 
5 The resolution was adopted by 20 votes in favour, 13 abstentions and 14 against: Human Rights Council, ǮElaboration of an )nternational Legally Binding )nstrument on Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rightsǯ ʹ͸th Session (25th 
June 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1. 
6 (uman Rights Council, ǮReport of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to (uman Rightsǯ (10 
July 2015) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session1/ 
Draftreport.pdf> accessed 21 April 2016. 
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It was the experiences of the State of Ecuador in its turbulent litigation 
against Chevron that prompted this shift back towards hard law standards.7 In 
addition to the investment arbitration mounted against Ecuador by Chevron, 
several Ecuadorian villagers have initiated domestic legal challenges against the 
corporation. These civil actions accused Texaco (later acquired by Chevron) of 
contaminating an oil field between 1964 and 1992, giving rise to widespread 
environmental damage affecting the health and livelihoods of the local 
population. In November 2013 the Ecuadorian Supreme Court ordered the 
corporation to pay $9.5 billion USD in compensation.8 Having initially argued on 
the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens that the Ecuadorian courts 
were better suited to hear the action, Chevron subsequently claimed that the 
case should be heard in the US. Consequently, since 2011, there has been 
additional protracted litigation in US courts,9 and a 2015 ruling by the Supreme 
Court of Canada permitting the claimants to pursue enforcement of the 
Ecuadorian award of damages under Canadian jurisdiction. 10  The legal 
challenges surrounding this complex case continue, and the final outcome 
remains uncertain.11 
This context notwithstanding, the aim of this article is not to argue the 
merits or demerits of a business and human rights treaty. Rather, it will respond 
in detail to four key factors that call into question the projectǯs feasibility. In 
particular, it will address: (i) the theoretical basis for the extension of direct 
international obligations to non-State actors; (ii) the determination of relevant 
duty-bearers and the allocation of responsibility; (iii) the scope and limits of the 
obligations; and (iv) remedies and enforcement mechanisms. Over the course of 
this discussion, the potential utility of analogies drawn from existing domestic 
and international law in surmounting these significant doctrinal impediments 
                                                        
7 N Cely, ǮBalancing Profit and Environmental Sustainability in Ecuador: Lessons Learned From the Chevron Caseǯ ȋʹͲͳͶȌ ʹͶ Duke Environ L & Policy Forum 353; CA Whytock, ǮChevron-Ecuador Case: Three Dimensions of Complexity in Transnational Dispute Resolutionǯ ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ͳͲ͸ 
ASIL Proc 425. 
8 Aguinda v Chevron-Texaco, Case No 11-1150 (3 January 2012) (Appellate Panel, Ecuador) 
<http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-01-03-appeal-decision-english.pdf> accessed 21 
April 2016; For Chevronǯs successful bi-lateral investment arbitration, see: Chevron Corporation 
and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, (First Interim Award, 25 January 2012) 
PCA Case No 2009-23 (UNCITRAL Rules) 16-17; The subsequent 2013 decision upheld the ruling, 
but lowered the damages payable: A Valencia, ǮEcuador high court upholds Chevron Verdict, halves fineǯ (Reuters, 13 November 2013) 
<http://ca.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idCABRE9AC0YY20131113> accessed 21 April 
2016. 
9 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, (Order of the US 
District Court in the Republic of Ecuador v Stratus Consulting Inc, 29 May 2013) PCA Case No 
2009-23 (UNCITRAL Rules); For US case documentation: International Treaty Arbitration 
<http://www.italaw.com/cases/257> accessed 21 April 2016. 
10 Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje (2015) SCC 42. 
11 MD Goldhaber, ǮThe Global Lawyer: Will Chevron Lose in the Second Circuit?ǯ (The AmLaw 
Litigation Daily, 23 April 2015) <http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202724404971/The-
Global-Lawyer-Will-Chevron-Lose-in-the-Second-Circuit?slreturn=20150729103702> accessed 
21 April 2016. 
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will be demonstrated.12 In providing a thorough examination of these challenges, 
it is hoped that the study will advance the burgeoning dialogue on the topic of 
direct non-State actor regulation, and contribute positively to the debate 
surrounding the future normative development of international human rights 
law.  
II. LAYING THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE TREATY 
 
The first hurdle to the establishment of a business and human rights treaty is 
conceptual. It demands a robust explanation of the theoretical validity of a treaty 
that is concluded between States but whose addressees include non-State actors. 
Classically, international law has been perceived as a system governing inter-
State relations. Dominant positivist scholarship exhibits a general reluctance to 
include non-State entities as subjects (as opposed to objects) of regulation,13 
despite the increasing public influence of these entities,14 and the substantial 
decline in State power.15 One of the core reasons for this hesitance stems from 
received theoretical bases of international law.16 In line with recent scholarship, 
this section argues that a formalist reading of international legal personality may 
liberate international law from its classical constraints,17 providing a more 
logical basis for the development of a system of law that is open to the direct 
regulation of non-State actors. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for the 
formulation of a human rights treaty that directly addresses transnational 
corporations and other business actors. 
                                                        
12 JE Noyes & BD Smith, ǮState Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liabilityǯ ȋͳͻͺͺȌ ͳ͵ Yale J )ntǯl L 250. 
13 R McCorquodale, ǮBeyond State Sovereignty: The )nternational Legal System and Non-State Participantsǯ ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ ͺ )ntǯl L Rev Colomb ͳʹʹ; R McCorquodale, ǮAn )nclusive )nternational Legal Systemǯ ȋʹͲͲͶȌ ͳ7 Leiden JIL 447; Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 2) 61; R Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, 1994) 49. 
14 JE Nijman ǮNon-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: Revisiting the Realist Theory of )nternational Legal Personalityǯ in Noortmann & Ryngaert ȋn ʹȌ ͻ͵; Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations (n 2) 3. 
15 R Domingo, ǮThe Crisis of )nternational Lawǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ Ͷʹ Vand J Transnatǯl L 1551; G Acquaviva, ǮSubjects of )nternational Law: A Power-based Analysisǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ͵ͺ Vand J Transnatǯl L ͵Ͷͷ; M van 
Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (CUP, 1999) 336-414. 
16 D Kennedy, Ǯ)nternational Law and the Nineteenth Century: (istory of an )llusionǯ (1998) 17 
QLR 99. 
17 R Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (CUP, 2010) 271; J Kyriakakis Ǯ)nternational Legal Personality, Collective Entities and )nternational Crimesǯ in N Gal-Or, C Ryngaert & M 
Noortmann (eds) Responsibilities of the Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place: 
Theoretical and Empirical Findings (Brill 2015) ͺ͵; J Kammerhofer, ǮNon-State Actors from the 
Perspective of the Pure Theory of Lawǯ in J dǯAspremont ȋedȌ, Multiple Perspectives on Non-State 
Actors in International Law (Routledge, 2011) 54; J Kammerhofer, ǮThe Benefits of the Pure Theory of Law for )nternational Lawyers, or: What use is Kelsenian Theoryǯ ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ ͳʹ )ntǯl 
Theory 5; J Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (Routledge, 
2011); J dǯAspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the 
Ascertainment of Legal Rules ȋOUP, ʹͲͳʹȌ; J dǯAspremont & J Kammerhofer (eds) International 
Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (CUP, 2015). 
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Sensitivities on the part of States and legal scholars underscore the 
reticence to extend international legal personality to non-State actors. Their 
concerns stem from the political and legal effects perceived to result from the 
recognition of non-State actors as subjects of international law. The situation is 
exacerbated by the unhelpful binary divide maintained between ǮStateǯ and Ǯnon-Stateǯ entities,18 which prompts the concern that if one non-State actor is Ǯimbuedǯ with legal personality, the same will necessarily follow for other 
entities.19 These anxieties regarding the political legitimization of non-State 
actors are directly related to questions of legal legitimacy,20 and in particular, 
theoretical justifications relating to the validity or binding quality of 
international law. Each is rooted in the underlying contractarian rationale in 
which dominant positivist scholarship remains entrenched.21 The origins of this 
view are readily apparent in the post-Vattellian scholarship22 of late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century German23 and Italian scholars,24 who came to view 
the State as factually, socially and historically constituted, possessing pseudo-
psychological traits such as a sovereign Ǯwillǯ.25 The State was treated as an a 
priori concept; it preceded the existence of international law, contributed to its 
formulation, and validated it via its consensual will.26 
Thus, the primacy of States in the international legal system was codified, 
despite the notable absence of a workable definition of their constituent 
                                                        
18 P Alston, ǮThe ǲNot-a-Catǳ Syndrome: Can the )nternational (uman Rights Regime 
Accommodate Non-State Actors?ǯ in P Alston  (ed), Non State Actors and Human Rights (OUP, 
2005) 6; A Peters, L Koechlin, T Förster & Others (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (CUP 
2009) 14; D Josselin & W Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2001) 3-4; ME OǯConnell, ǮEnhancing the Status of Non-State Actors through a Global War on Terror?ǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ Ͷ͵ Colum J Transnatǯl L 437. 
19 D Steinhoff, ǮTalking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging Non-State Armed Groupsǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ Ͷͷ Tex )ntǯl LJ 308; S Rondeau, ǮParticipation of Armed Groups in the Development of the Law Applicable to Armed Conflictsǯ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ ͻ͵ )ntǯl Rev Red Cross 658. 
20 Legitimacy is defined as a feature of rules which induce compliance from their addressees: T 
Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP, 1990) 24; D Bodansky, ǮThe Concept of 
Legitimacy in )nternational Lawǯ in R Wolfrum & V Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law 
(Springer, 2008) 313-15. 
21 M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960 (CUP, 2002) 204; T Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP, 1998) 28; 
The Case of the SS ǲLotusǳ (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (ser. A) No 10, 18. 
22 P Allott, Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (CUP, 2002) 406; A Orakhelashvili, ǮThe Origins of Consensual Positivism - Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattelǯ in A Orakhelashvili (ed), 
Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011) 93-4; R Domingo, ǮGaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigmǯ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ ʹʹ EJ)L ͸ʹ͹. 
23 J von Bernstorff , The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen (CUP, 2010) 15-43; JE 
Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of 
International Law (TMC Asser Press, 2004) 110-15; JEK Murkens, From Empire to Union: 
Conceptions of German Constitutional Law since 1871 (OUP, 2013) 19; Koskenniemi (n 21) 441-2; 
RY Paz, A Gateway Between a Distant God and a Cruel World: The Contribution of Jewish German-
Speaking Scholars to International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 144-5. 
24 Portmann (n 17) 49-50; G Gaja, ǮPositivism and Dualism in Dionisio Anzilottiǯ ȋͳͻͻʹȌ ͵ EJ)L 
127. 
25 Nijman, International Legal Personality (n 23) 113. 
26 Portmann (n 17) 70. 
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empirical features.27 The terms Ǯsubjectǯ, Ǯcreatorǯ, Ǯvalidatorǯ and Ǯenforcerǯ 
became effectively synonymous. As a result, dominant scholarship conflates the 
creators of international legal rules with the subjects or addressees of those 
rules. These roles were perceived as the natural competences of States, 
stemming from their uncontested social and historical prestige. The nexus 
between the explanations of legal validity implicit within classical international 
legal doctrine and the political sensitivities surrounding the international legal 
personality of non-State actors may be traced to this doctrinal position. It has led 
to the view that if non-State actors are the direct addressees of international 
rules, whatever their content, this will place them on par with States politically. 
As a corollary, it has given rise to the claim that in order for non-State actors to 
be legitimately bound by international rules, they must consent to those rules, 
and thus, participate in their formulation.28 While it is has been suggested that 
such objections are unsustainable because they confuse Ǯpersonality with legitimacyǯ,29 it is argued that this conflation is a direct consequence of the 
dominant theoretical conception of international law. As such, traditional 
scholarship erroneously produces politically contentious, practically unworkable 
results that have stayed progress in the field of non-State actor regulation.  
Recent scholarship has begun to recognise that a formalist approach to 
international legal personality has the potential to establish the theoretical 
foundations for the direct regulation of non-State actors, free from undesirable 
presumptions relating to political status and law-making capacity.30 The positive 
effects of such an approach is apparent in the formalist conception of the 
international legal order advanced by Kelsenǯs Pure Theory of Law. The theory is 
premised on a strict methodological separation between Ǯis’ and Ǯought’.31 It 
defines legal orders as hierarchal systems of Ǯnormsǯ.32 A norm describes a 
behaviour that ought to occur, as entirely distinct from the actual existence or 
fulfilment of the act prescribed.33 Thus, while a legal rule might provide that Ǯall 
murderers are to be punishedǯ, this rule says nothing about whether all 
                                                        
27 TD Grant, ǮDefining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontentsǯ ȋͳͻͻͻȌ ͵͹ Colum J Transnatǯl L 413. 
28 C Ryngaert, Ǯ)mposing )nternational Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of )nternational Lawǯ in Noortmann & Ryngaert (n 2) 69-70; S Wheatley, ǮDemocratic Governance 
Beyond the State: The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors as Standard Settersǯ in Peters, Koechlin & 
Förster (n 18) 215-40; R McCorquodale, ǮNon-State Actors and International (uman Rights Lawǯ 
in S Joseph & A McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2010) 114. 
29 JK Kleffner ǮThe Applicability of )nternational (umanitarian Law to Organised Armed Groupsǯ 
(20ͳͳȌ ͻ͵ )ntǯl Rev Red Cross 455. 
30 For a significantly expanded argument on this topic see: LJ McConnell, Extracting 
Accountability from Non-State Actors in International Law (Routledge, 2016). 
31 Allott (n 22) 83 para 3.26; D Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (first published 1738, Allman, 
1817) Vol II, Bk III, Pt I, 154-172; I Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (first published 1781, NK 
Smith tr, Macmillan, 1963) 313. 
32 H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (first published 1945, A Wedberg tr, Harvard 
University Press, 1949) 123-124. 
33 H Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (M Knight tr, 2nd edn, University of California Press, 1970) 6. 
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murderers are actually caught, convicted, and sanctioned. Legal norms are 
simply prescriptive statements; their validity is not contingent upon facts.34 As is 
already apparent, this method distinguishes itself from the contractarian 
explanations of validity advanced in dominant positivist scholarship. Such an 
approach would violate the is/ought dichotomy by utilising an is (the factually 
conceived State) to explain the validity of an ought (legal norms). Instead, the 
State is viewed entirely in juristic terms. A State is not an area of territory, a 
government, a permanent population, or an amalgam of these physical 
properties. It is the rule defining a Stateǯs territory that is relevant to the study of 
law rather than the actual territory.35 According to this view, States are like all 
legal persons; they are personified bundles of rights and duties ultimately 
addressing individuals.36  
This conception proves enlightening with respect to the definition of 
international legal personality provided by the International Court of Justiceǯs 
(ICJ) Reparation Advisory Opinion. 37  That an entity is perceived as an 
international legal person to the extent that it is so-defined by positive law38 is 
not problematic under formalist logic.39 That different entities might be the 
addressees of varying rights and obligations40 need not be expressed in terms such as Ǯfullǯ or Ǯlimitedǯ personality. Legal persons are merely devices employed 
to describe legal phenomena, in particular, the referral or imputation of norms regulating human behaviour to an Ǯorderǯ or Ǯcorporationǯ. 41  This includes, but is 
not necessarily limited to, States.42 The consequences of this view in the context 
of non-State actors are clear; international personality is an entirely open and 
neutral concept.43 It entails no presumptions as to the political status of the 
entity, or as to which rights and capacities a Ǯsubjectǯ of international law 
naturally Ǯpossessesǯ.44 Rather, the law-making capacity of States is prescribed by 
a higher norm, or more specifically, such a competence is assigned by the law to 
an individual, in their capacity as an agent, and then imputed to the State legal 
order. Thus, the conflation between addressee and law-maker is completely 
dissolved on this formalist view. Law-creating competence may be imputed to 
any entity, but it is not necessary to establish the validity of an obligation.  
                                                        
34 Kelsen, General Theory (n 32) 45. 
35 ibid. 189. 
36 ibid. 95-6. 
37 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) ICJ 
Reports [1949] (hereafter Reparation). 
38 ibid. 179. 
39 Kammerhofer, ǮBenefitsǯ ȋn ͳ͹) 36. 
40 ǮThe subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rightsǯ. Reparation (n 37) 178. 
41 SL Paulson, Ǯ(ans Kelsenǯs Doctrine of )mputationǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ͳͶ Ratio Juris Ͷ͹. 
42 H Kelsen, Principles of International Law (Rinehart & Co, 1952) 98. 
43 Portmann (n 17) 175. 
44 J dǯAspremont, ǮThe Doctrine of Fundamental Rights of States and the Functions of Anthropomorphic Thinking in )nternational Lawǯ ȋʹͲͳͷȌ Ͷ CJ)CL (forthcoming); Portmann (n 17) 
177; Kelsen, Principles (n 42) 148-9. 
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Kelsenǯs model assuages traditional contractarian anxieties in 
international law concerning the attribution of responsibility to third parties in 
relation to primary obligations to which they have not themselves expressly 
consented.45 Binding quality is not derived from the consent or natural status of 
the addressee but from the legal order itself, which ultimately finds its basis in 
the Grundnorm or basic norm.46 While the controversy surrounding this concept 
cannot be denied, it is suggested that this stems from its mischaracterization as a 
form of validation akin to that espoused by naturalist jurisprudence.47 Kelsenǯs 
explanation of legal validity ultimately rests on a basic norm that cannot be 
positively determined. As such, the Grundnorm may be taken to be equivalent to 
a command emanating from the divine. )n Kelsenǯs words: 
[T]he theory of the basic norm may be considered a natural law doctrine in keeping with Kantǯs transcendental logic. There still remains the 
enormous difference which separates, and forever must separate, the 
transcendental conditions of all empirical knowledge and consequently 
the laws prevailing in nature on the one side from the transcendent 
metaphysics beyond all experience on the other.48  
Thus, while the basic norm may serve the same validating function, and 
while its existence also lies beyond positivist determination, its purpose is 
entirely different and its content is entirely empty.49 The content of all legal 
norms is always positively determined.50 The basic norm simply makes the 
cognition of legal norms possible: it is a prism through which norms are 
discernible. The basis of Pure Theory is a value-free presumption of legal validity 
necessary for the cognition of a positively-defined legal order as a system of 
norms, and not a theological ideal with substantive moral content.51 Just as the 
notion of cause and effect in natural science (is) must be prevented from infinite regress via the presumption of a Ǯfirst causeǯ, the Grundnorm serves the same 
function in the realm of norms (ought).52 The Grundnorm is the Pure Theoryǯs Ǯbig bangǯ.  
While the strength of this justification in the context of neo-Kantian 
philosophy has also been subject to cogent criticism,53 undermining the necessity 
                                                        
45 M Jackson, Complicity in International Law (OUP, 2015) 13. 
46 Kelsen, Principles (n 42) 314. 
47 S (all, ǮThe Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, )nternational Order and the Limits of Legal Positivismǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ͳʹ EJ)L 300; D Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Revised edn, Penguin, 1981) 194. 
48 Kelsen, Principles (n 42) 437-8. 
49 Bernstorff (n 23) 115-16. 
50 Kammerhofer, Uncertainty (n 17) 219. 
51 R Tur, ǮThe Kelsenian Enterpriseǯ in R Tur & W Twining (eds), Essays on Kelsen, (Clarendon 
Press, 1986) 155; W Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law (AM Kelley, 1969) 32. 
52 Tur (n 51) 169. 
53 SL Paulson, ǮThe Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsenǯs Pure Theory of Lawǯ ȋͳͻͻʹȌ ͳ2 Ox J Leg 
Stud 322-32; U Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm?: A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen’s Doctrine 
(Springer, 2002) 24-8; H Kelsen, ǮCausality and )mputationǯ ȋͳͻͷͲȌ ͸ͳ Ethics ͳ. 
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of a strictly normative view of law, this is not fatal to the theory.54 Rather, its 
claim to uniqueness in solving the antinomy between natural and positive law is 
undermined, and the theory simply Ǯtakes its place alongside other normativist legal theories… perhaps best understood as offering a legal point of view.ǯ55 In the 
context of non-State actor regulation, it is clear that the strictly normative view 
advanced has utility both as a critical methodology which exposes the weakness 
of traditional doctrine, and in the construction of a potential theoretical 
foundation that is receptive to the direct regulation of business actors. This basis 
having been established, the precise form and content of a binding business and 
human rights treaty raises three other important questions, which are addressed 
in the remaining subsections below. 
III. IDENTIFYING DUTY-BEARERS, ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Hart famously distinguished between primary and secondary rules.56 The former 
define the behaviours which addressees ought to engage in or refrain from, and the latter are Ǯin a sense parasitic upon or secondary to the firstǯ,57 determining 
the manner in which primary rules may be created/modified, or controlling the 
manner in which primary rules operate in adjudication. A longstanding issue 
concerning the establishment of liability for the adverse effects produced by the 
cumulative acts of State and non-State actors is the lack of primary rules 
governing the conduct of non-State actors. After all, Ǯif there are no primary obligations to begin with, a regime of responsibility simply cannot applyǯ.58 
However, as primary rules such as those posited by the proposed treaty emerge, 
and multiple actors with human rights obligations are implicated in the same 
harmful outcomes, questions surrounding the secondary rules governing the 
apportionment of responsibility naturally arise.59 Even in relation to States, Ǯinternational law has not developed sophisticated rules and procedures for 
adjudicating and apportioning responsibility between States in the position of multiple tortfeasorsǯ.60 Naturally, the situation regarding non-State actors is even 
less developed. Presently, the only manner of holding private actors to account in 
                                                        
54 Paulson, ǮThe Neo-Kantian Dimensionǯ ȋn ͷ͵Ȍ; S (ammer, ǮA Neo-Kantian Theory of Knowledge in Kelsenǯs Pure Theory of Lawǯ in SL Paulson & B Litschewski-Paulson (eds), Normativity and 
Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (OUP, 1999) 177-94. 
55 Paulson, ǮThe Neo-Kantian Dimensionǯ ȋn ͷ͵) 332; On Kelsen and the Ǯlegal point of viewǯ: J Raz, 
The Authority of Law (first published 1979, 2nd edn, OUP, 2009) 140-5. 
56 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1961) 81. 
57 ibid. 
58 J dǯAspremont, A Nollkaemper, I Plakokefalos & C Ryngaert, ǮSharing Responsibility Between 
Non-State Actors and States in International Law: Introductionǯ ȋʹͲͳͷȌ ͸ʹ Neth )nt Law Rev 49, 
61; Jackson (n 45) 127. 
59 W Vandenhole, ǮShared Responsibility of Non-State Actors: A (uman Rights Perspectiveǯ in Gal-
Or, Ryngaert & Noortmann (n 17) 56. 
60 P Okowa, State Responsibility for Transboundary Air Pollution in International Law (OUP, 2000) 
195. 
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international law is via attribution of the offending conduct to a State.61 It has 
been demonstrated above that the theoretical impediments to the establishment 
of obligations addressing non-State actors have perhaps been overstated. The 
clear scope provided by alternative theoretical approaches and the political will 
evident in the Ecuadorian initiative notwithstanding, the exact shape of the rules 
governing the allocation of responsibility for wrongs perpetrated by multiple 
actors remains uncertain. The exploration of these questions has gained 
significant traction in recent years in the pioneering work of Nollkaemper and 
Jacobs,62 among others,63 into the notion of shared responsibility in international 
law. Drawing on this literature, this section unpacks some of the methods 
posited to date, and assesses their utility in relation to the proposed treaty.  
The identification of duty-bearers and the allocation of responsibility 
constitute pressing issues in the practical realization of the proposed treaty. 
Should delegates proceed to identify States as the sole duty-bearers in the 
proposed treaty, the instrument may prove to be redundant before it is drafted. 
If this were the case, the instrument may simply restate the principles of State 
responsibility for private actors already articulated in widely ratified human 
rights treaties.64 The factors that inhibit the efficacy of these existing obligations 
rest on the unwillingness or incapacity of many host States to give effect to their 
international obligations, in light of widespread corruption, 65  fragile 
governmental infrastructures66 and the quest for capital via FDI.67 This article 
argues that a regime addressing both States and non-State actors is required to 
ensure effective engagement with fundamental human rights standards. This 
section identifies four interrelated methods by which shared responsibility 
might be allocated between these actors in the context of a business and human 
rights treaty. The approach adopted is holistic, recognising and incorporating 
                                                        
61 M Karavias, ǮShared Responsibility and Multinational Enterprisesǯ (2015) 62 Neth Int Law Rev 
96.  
62 A Nollkaemper & D Jacobs, ǮShared Responsibility in )nternational Law: A Conceptual Frameworkǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ ͵Ͷ Mich J )ntǯl L 359. 
63 A Nollkaemper & I Plakokefalos (eds) Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: 
An Appraisal of the State of the Art ȋCambridge University Press, ʹͲͳͶȌ; Karavias, ǮShared 
Responsibilityǯ ȋn ͸ͳȌ ͻͳ; V Bílková, ǮArmed Opposition Groups and Shared Responsibilityǯ 
(2015) 62 Neth Int Law Rev 69; S MacLeod, ǮPrivate Security Companies and Shared 
Responsibility: The Turn to Multistakeholder Standard-Setting and Monitoring through Self-
Regulation-Plusǯ ȋʹͲͳͷȌ ͸ʹ Neth Int Law Rev 119; KN Trapp, ǮShared Responsibility and Non-State Terrorist Actorsǯ ȋʹͲͳͷȌ ͸ʹ Neth )nt Law Rev 141. 
64 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (18 December 
1979) 1249 UNTS 13, art 2(e); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (24 January 
2007) A/RES/61/106, art 4(e); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965) 660 UNTS 195, art 2(1)(d); Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (18 December 
1990) A/RES/45/158, art 16(2); JA Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Limitations and Opportunities in International Law (CUP, 2006) 81-3. 
65 O Oluduro, Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities 
(Intersentia, 2014) 353. 
66 P Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2007) 104-9. 
67 A McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Routledge, 2010) 2. 
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existing responsibility regimes that are external to the proposed treaty, and 
drawing analogies from existing international law in framing the particular rules 
within the instrument itself. Each tier responds to a different level of culpability, 
demonstrating how a rule structure might be utilized to provide a nuanced 
division of responsibility that is responsive to common scenarios and 
weaknesses within the existing legal framework. 
 
A. Attribution to the State 
 
The first method of allocating responsibility can be derived from the )nternational Law Commissionǯs ȋ)LCȌ Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASRIWA). To date, these provisions have had 
limited practical utility in establishing State responsibility for the conduct of 
business actors. Nevertheless, they provide a workable model for the attribution 
of responsibility where a State has played an instrumental role in the adverse 
human rights impacts of a private actor, and thus will likely play some role in the 
application of a business and human rights treaty.  
The ASRIWA detail specific instances in which the conduct of private 
entities may be directly attributed to a State.68 This approach to non-State actor 
accountability is wholly dependent on the factual connection between the non-
State entity and the responsible State.69 Any claim in this regard is actionable 
solely as a result of the attribution of the wrongful act to the State. There is no 
secondary or joint responsibility assigned to the non-State actor, and given that 
this form of responsibility is already articulated by the ASRIWA, it would likely 
not need to feature in the proposed treaty. States may be held accountable for 
violations of their international obligations committed vicariously through 
private actors.70 The fact that States will be responsible for the abusive acts of 
their organs and agents,71 even when acting beyond their official capacity,72 is 
fairly non-contentious.73 There are four key circumstances in which private 
behaviour will be considered attributable to the State, each of which hinges on 
                                                        
68 On the historical development of the ASRIWA: J Crawford, ǮThe )LCǯs Articles on the Responsibility of States for )nternationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospectǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͻ͸ AJ)L 874; A Pellet, ǮThe )LCǯs Articles on State Responsibility for )nternationally Wrongful Acts and Related 
Textsǯ in J Crawford, A Pellet & Others (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 
75-94. 
69 G Cronogue, ǮRebels, Negligent Support, and State Accountability: (olding States Accountable 
for the Human Rights Violations of Non-State Actorsǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ ʹ͵ Duke J Comp & )ntǯl L ͵͸ͷ. 
70 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) UN Doc A/ͷ͸/ͶͻȋVol. )Ȍ/Corr.Ͷ, art ʹ ȋhereafter ASR)WAȌ; A State may not Ǯabsolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies.ǯ Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom, 
Application No 13134/87 (ECtHR, 1993) [27]. 
71 ibid. arts 4, 5 & 6. 
72 ibid. art 7. 
73 Ilaşcu & Others v Moldova and Russia, Application No 48787/99 (ECtHR 2004) [319]. 
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the actorǯs relationship with the State government.74 First, while the conduct of 
private entities is not prima facie attributable to the State,75 even when the 
corporation is wholly owned by the State, or the State possesses a controlling 
interest in it,76 the conduct of entities exercising elements of governmental 
authority may be imputed to the State.77 The relevant conduct must relate to 
governmental activity and not to other private or commercial operations, though 
the ILC has not provided precise definitions in this regard.78 This provision is 
particularly pertinent given the international trend toward the privatization of 
governmental functions.79  
The three remaining scenarios are articulated in articles 8-11. Pursuant to 
these provisions, certain conduct that does not result directly from the actions of 
the State, its organs or agents is nonetheless imputed to the State. The least 
contentious is article 11, which provides that conduct will be attributable where a ǮState acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.ǯ80 More 
problematically, conduct is attributable to the State where an entity operates 
under its direction or control.81 Such conduct will rise to this level Ǯonly if it 
directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of that operation.ǯ82 In its Nicaragua decision, the ICJ considered 
whether the conduct of a group of insurgent forces termed the ǮContrasǯ was 
attributable to the US on the basis of the financial support provided by the State. 
It held that Ǯdespite the heavy subsidiaries and other support provided to them 
by the United States, there is no clear evidence of the United States having 
                                                        
74 I Tófalo, ǮOvert and (idden Accomplices: Transnational Corporationsǯ Range of Complicity for (uman Rights Violationsǯ in De Schutter, Transnational Corporations (n 2) 336-9; Arts 16-18, 
which deal with relations between two States have also been used by analogy vis-à-vis States and 
private entities: S Ratner, ǮCorporations and (uman Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibilityǯ 
(2001) 111 Yale LJ 500-6. 
75 R McCorquodale & P Simons, ǮResponsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Lawǯ ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ ͹Ͳ MLR 
606. 
76 ǮThe fact that an entity can be classified as public or private… the existence of a greater or lesser State participation… in the ownership of its assets, the fact that it is not subject to 
executive control—these are not decisive criteria for the purpose of attribution of the entityǯs conduct to the State.ǯ )LC, ǮReport of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 
Fifty-Third Sessionǯ ȋʹ͵ April – 1 June and 2 July – ͳͲ August ʹͲͲͳȌ YB )ntǯl L Comm, Vol )), UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (2001) 43, 48. 
77 ASRIWA (n 70) art 5. 
78 The ASR)WA do Ǯnot attempt to identify precisely the scope of ǲgovernmental activityǳ… what is regarded as ǲgovernmentalǳ depends on the particular society, its history and traditions.ǯ )LC, ǮReport on the Work of its Fifty-Third Sessionǯ ȋn ͹͸) 43. 
79 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations (n 2) 3; Zerk (n 64) 77-ͺ; N Rosemann, ǮThe Privatisation 
of Human Rights Violations – Businessǯ )mpunity or Corporate Responsibility? The Case of (uman Rights Abuses and Torture in )raqǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ͷ Non-State Actors & )ntǯl L ͹͹. 
80 ASRIWA (n 70) art 11. 
81 ibid. art 8. 
82 )LC, ǮReport on the Work of its Fifty-Third Sessionǯ ȋn ͹͸) 47. 
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exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify the Contras as acting 
on its behalf.ǯ83 
The approach in Nicaragua has been criticized in subsequent 
international jurisprudence,84 and it is generally accepted that the threshold will 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.85 However, it has been suggested that 
such a relationship will only be established in a small category of cases.86 Thus, 
while this constitutes an accepted method of achieving redress for non-State 
actor activity under the proposed treaty regime, it is unlikely to aid the majority 
of victims.87 Furthermore, Ratner suggests that there may be instances in which Ǯthe company is effectively the superior and the State is the agentǯ.88 While such 
instances are possible in light of the economic power wielded by many business 
actors, the ASRIWA do not cater for this inverse scenario. States alone bear the 
obligations, and are treated as Ǯcommanderǯ in their relations with private actors, 
irrespective of the facts. 
Whereas the conduct contemplated by the ASRIWA is contingent on the 
close proximity between private entity and State, and accusations of complicity 
and impunity are leveraged at weak governance States with some regularity,89 
violations are also likely to result from the basic incapacity or unwillingness of 
the State to effectively regulate its domestic affairs.90 In this context, purely 
State-based approaches to non-State actor regulation truly fall apart. The conception of State regulation through municipal law is justified Ǯon the basis 
that the State has, at least in theory, the constitutional authority to legislate and 
regulate such actions to ensure their compliance with its international obligations.ǯ91 Yet in many States, such regulation is entirely unrealistic. The 
traditional treatment of non-State actors is staunchly Western and fails to 
account for the realities of life in weak governance States.92 The existence, will 
                                                        
83 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States of America) ICJ Reports [1986] 
[109]. 
84 In Tadić, the acts of an armed group were attributable where it Ǯhas a role in organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions,ǯ rather than controlling particular operations: 
Prosecutor v Tadić, (Appeals Chamber) IT-94-1-A, (15 July 1999) 1541 [117], [137]; cf Bosnian 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Reports [2007] [392] (hereafter, 
Bosnian Genocide). 
85 )LC, ǮReport on the Work of its Fifty-Third Sessionǯ ȋn ͹͸) 48. 
86 Ratner (n 74) 500. 
87 Cronogue (n 69) 365-88. 
88 Ratner (n 74) 493-4. 
89 Doe v Unocal Corp, 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir 2002); W Kaleck & M Saage-Maaβ, ǮCorporate 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimesǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͺ J)CJ 
704; Tófalo (n 74) 339-48. 
90 E De Brabandere, Ǯ(uman Rights Obligations and Transnational Corporations: The Limits of Direct Corporate Responsibilityǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ Ͷ (um Rts & )ntǯl Legal Discourse 77. 
91 D Kinley & J Tadaki, ǮFrom Talk to Walk: The Emergence of (uman Rights Responsibilities for 
Corporations at International Lawǯ ȋʹͲͲͶȌ ͶͶ Va J )ntǯl L 948. 
92 D Neubert, ǮLocal and Regional Non-State Actors on the Margins of Public Policy in Africaǯ in 
Peters, Koechlin & Förster (n 18) 36. 
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and capacity of the State as a regulator is simply assumed.93 Thus, the attribution 
regime will need to be supplemented with other categories of responsibility in 
order to ensure the regulatory gap is adequately filled. 
 
B. Complicity 
Given that a treaty could impose direct international human rights obligations on 
both State and non-State actors, a scenario could arise in which the non-State 
entity served as the principal actor in the perpetuation of human rights abuses. 
The role of the State would therefore be secondary. Similarly, a non-State actor 
could facilitate human rights abuses propagated by a State without its actions 
rising to the level of attribution described above. The question arises as to 
whether a complicity rule which derives responsibility from the principal actorǯs 
wrongful conduct, rather than attributing the wrongful conduct to a secondary 
actor, may hold utility. The key to complicity of this kind lies in the distinction 
between primary and secondary rules introduced above. An analogy may be 
drawn with the ASRIWA, article 16 of which has proven difficult to categorize: 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible 
for doing so if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would 
be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.94 
Although the ILCǯs mandate was to produce guidance on the operation of 
secondary rules of responsibility,95 it has been convincingly argued that this 
provision constitutes a separate, albeit atypical,96 primary rule of obligation.97 
Indeed, the Special Rapporteur for State Responsibility, Roberto Ago, stated that Ǯthe Commission should not hesitate to leap that barrier [between primary and 
                                                        
93 R McCorquodale, ǮOverlegalising Silences: (uman Rights and Non-State Actorsǯ ȋ2002) 96 ASIL 
Proc 384. 
94 ASRIWA (n 70) art 16. 
95 D Bodansky & JR Crook, ǮSymposium: The )LCǯs State Responsibility Articles - Introduction and Overviewǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͻ͸ AJ)L 777-ͺ; B Graefrath, ǮComplicity in the Law of )nternational Responsibilityǯ (1996) 2 Revue Belge De Droit International 372; CJ Tams, ǮAllǯs Well That Ends 
Well - Comments on the )LCǯs Articles on State Responsibilityǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͸ʹ ZaӧRV 764. 
96 ǮPrimary rules on complicity… inform their addressees that assistance to a given violation of 
another obligation is prohibited. Accordingly, they provide for a derivative obligation which 
differs from other primary obligations which just set forth a rather clear commandǯ. (P Aust, 
Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 188; G Nolte & 
HP Aust, ǮEquivocal (elpers – Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International LawǯȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͷͺ 
ICLQ 8.  
97 Jackson (n 45) 148-50; Tams (n 95) 764-5; Graefrath (n 95Ȍ ͵͹ͳ; U Linderfalk, ǮState 
Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology -The Role of Language for an Understanding of the )nternational Legal Systemǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ ͹ͺ Nordic J )ntǯl L ͷͺ-72; Bodansky & 
Crook (n 95) 779-91. 
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secondary rules] whenever necessaryǯ.98 Categorizing the rule in this way lends 
itself to the discussion of shared responsibility between two duty-bearers in a 
binding business and human rights treaty. This is because where a non-State 
actor, serving as the principal wrongdoer, engages in a direct breach of an 
obligation, a Stateǯs conduct which assists the non-State actorǯs substantive 
breach via positive act or omission could be said to breach a second primary 
obligation to refrain from complicit conduct. On this view, it may be possible to 
circumvent the problematic issue of attributing concurrent responsibility to 
multiple actors for the breach of a single primary rule,99 giving rise to a single 
wrongful act.100 There may be, in fact, two separate obligations; two separate 
breaches, giving rise to separate responsibilities, the derivative nature of the 
complicity rule notwithstanding. 
Whether or not one agrees with this categorization of the general 
complicity rule provided in article 16 ASRIWA, examples of specific complicity 
provisions framed as primary rules are observable in international practice.101 
An existing rule of this kind was identified during the ICJǯs Bosnian Genocide 
decision.102 Article ͳ of the Genocide Convention provides: ǮContracting Parties 
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punishǯ.103 
The ICJ recognised that the obligation to prevent genocide implies a primary rule 
that States ought not to engage in activity constituting complicity in the crime of 
genocide.104 While this teleological reading105 of the treaty by the ICJ has been 
subject to criticism,106 the express articulation of a rule analogous to article 16 
ASRIWA in the proposed business and human rights treaty would likely mitigate 
concerns stemming from this method of treaty interpretation.107 
                                                        
98 R Ago, Summary Record of the 1519th Meeting, UN Doc A/CN.4/SR1519 reprinted in [1978] 1 YB )ntǯl L Comm ͳ, ʹͶͲ; Similarly, the )LC stated: Ǯaid or assistance in the commission of a 
wrongful act by another remains in international law, like complicity in internal law, an act 
separate from such commission, an act that is classified differently and that does not necessarily produce the same legal consequences.ǯ Report of the )nternational Law Commission on the Work 
of its Thirteenth Session, 8 May-28 July ͳͻ͹ͺ, UN Doc A/͵͵/ͳͲ reprinted in [ͳͻ͹ͺ] ʹ YB )ntǯl L Comm ʹ, ͳͲ͵ para ͳ͸; V Lanovoy, ǮComplicity in an )nternationally Wrongful Actǯ in Nollkaemper 
& Plakokefalos (n 63) 139-40.  
99 This situation is captured under ASRIWA (n 70) art 47. 
100 Nollkaemper & Jacobs (n 62) 396-397; Vandenhole, ǮShared Responsibilityǯ ȋn ͷͻ) 60-1; JD Fry, ǮAttribution of Responsibilityǯ in Nollkaemper & Plakokefalos (n 63) 99.  
101 Nolte & Aust (n 97) 7-8; Crawford, ǮThe )LCǯs Articlesǯ ȋn ͸ͺ) 879. 
102 Bosnian Genocide (n 84); Jackson (n 45) 202-3. 
103 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 
78 UNTS 277, art 1. 
104 Bosnian Genocide (n 84) [167]; The approach was extended to art 3 of the Genocide 
Convention, which lists other punishable acts such as conspiracy, direct and public incitement, 
and attempt to commit genocide: Jackson (n 45) 203. 
105 P Gaeta, The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary (OUP, 2009) 33. 
106 P Gaeta, ǮOn What Conditions Can a State Be (eld Responsible for Genocide?ǯ ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ ͳͺ EJ)L 
633. 
107 Jackson (n 45) 214. 
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Some questions that will require greater consideration concern the scope 
of such a complicity obligation; what knowledge or intent is required on the part 
of the complicit party to engage the provision? Is the rule limited to positive 
action, or might it be extended to omission, influence, toleration and wilful 
blindness? This is perhaps where the analogy to ASRIWA might depart; 
classically, there has been concern surrounding the allocation of responsibility for Ǯinfluenceǯ in instances of internationally wrongful acts involving two States, 
due to sensitivities regarding the doctrines of sovereignty and non-
intervention.108 Jackson highlights the existing recognition of the capacity of 
States to influence non-State actors, and to foment or incite armed activities, and 
suggests that international law is not concerned with the influence of States on 
the conduct of non-State actors.  
As international law develops to recognise increased possibilities of 
principal wrongdoing by non-State actors, so the ways in which States 
might participate in that wrongdoing should be adequately sanctioned. This would include not simply the provision of assistance… but also 
complicit influence.109  
However, sovereignty concerns are likely to reappear in relation to the inverse 
scenario, where the economic influence of a non-State actor induces a State to 
engage in wrongful conduct, or to simply turn a blind eye to the wrongful acts of 
the corporation. As such, it is not clear whether a single primary rule precluding 
complicit conduct could be applied uniformly. 
 The level of contribution required to engage such a provision poses 
substantial questions.110 For Aust, Ǯ[i]t is theoretically conceivable that ǲaid or assistanceǳ comprises every act ȋor omissionȌ which facilitates the commission of an internationally wrongful act.ǯ111 The commentary to article 16 ASRIWA is 
itself silent on the nexus between principal and accomplice, providing: Ǯ[t]here is 
no requirement that the aid or assistance should have been essential to the 
performance of the internationally wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantlyǯ. 112  While this provision seems to demand that the conduct 
materially facilitates the commission of the wrongful act,113 the commentary 
acknowledges that conduct may constitute assistance where it is Ǯonly an 
                                                        
108 R Ago, ǮSeventh report on State Responsibilityǯ ʹͻ March, ͳ͹ April & Ͷ July ͳͻ͹ͺ, UN Doc A/CN.Ͷ/͵Ͳ͹ ͳ YB )ntǯl L Comm ͳ, ͷͷ para ͸͵. 
109 Jackson (n 45) 210.  
110 M Gibney, ǮLitigating Transnational Human Rights Abusesǯ in W Vandenhole (ed) Challenging 
Territoriality in Human Rights Law: Building Blocks for a Plural and Diverse Duty-Bear Regime 
(Routledge, 2015) 93. 
111 Aust (n 97) 195. 
112 )LC, ǮReport on the Work of its Fifty-Third Sessionǯ ȋn 76) 66 para 5. 
113 V Lowe, ǮResponsibility for the Conduct of other Statesǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͳͲͳ Japanese J )ntǯl L ͳ, ͳͳ-12; 
Nolte & Aust (n 97) 10.  
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incidental factor in the commission of the primary actǯ.114 Lowe provides a useful 
illustration, contemplating the situation in which a State provides financial 
backing for overseas investments by a company incorporated within its territory. 
He concludes Ǯ[t]here is no reason why State responsibility should not be engaged by the provision of the investment guarantee.ǯ115 Thus, a complicity 
provision in a binding business and human rights treaty might produce 
consequences for home States, as well as host States.116 Yet, the precise standard 
is not clear. In the case of specific complicity rules contained in other multilateral 
treaties, it appears that a material contribution test is favoured by most States.117 
Indeed, Jackson suggests that the material contribution standard should be 
preferred since Ǯit serves the interests of international cooperation to require a 
nexus beyond incidental contribution… [and] exclud[es] the incidental relationships that arise from virtually every State interactionǯ.118 The same is 
likely to apply to relationships between State and non-State actors. However, it is 
interesting to note the inconsistent approaches adopted by States in this regard. 
For instance, the United Kingdom endorsed a very liberal interpretation of an 
analogous complicity provision in the 1997 Ottawa Convention,119 only to later 
adopt a restrictive stance in relation to the 2005 Cluster Munitions Convention, 
120 advocating the deletion of an Ǯaid or assistanceǯ clause.121 
 The fine lines between governmental incapacity, wilful blindness and 
complicit omission are likely to cause significant practical issues in the 
categorization of State conduct, and demand careful consideration in light of the 
forgoing context regarding the transnational operations of business actors. The 
ICJ in Bosnian Genocide expressly stated that Ǯcomplicity always requires some positive action… while complicity results from commission, violation of the obligation to prevent results from omissionǯ.122 Similarly, Agoǯs Seventh Report 
on State Responsibility provides:  
                                                        
114 )LC, ǮReport on the Work of its Fifty-Third Sessionǯ ȋn ͹͸) 67 para 10. 
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2014) 272-355. 
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rt_1.pdf> accessed 21 April 2016.  
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[A] case of ǲparticipationǳ in the internationally wrongful act of another 
cannot be found in the [sole fact] that a State failed to take preventative or repressive measures required of it… This does not mean that in specific 
cases there may not also be participation… But there is an additional 
element, a separate breach besides the mere failure to prevent and 
punish.123  
Jackson suggests that complicity via omission is doctrinally and normatively 
supported in municipal and international criminal law, though he recognises that Ǯ[m]any more omissions will violate the obligation to prevent genocide than constitute complicity… But in some circumstances, a particularly culpable 
proximate omission, where both mens rea and nexus requirements are met, 
should be seen to constitute complicity.ǯ124 Clearly then, not all omissions will 
give rise to the complicit responsibility of a secondary actor, unless the omission 
substantially contributed to the principal wrong and the actor possessed 
sufficient knowledge. Indeed, the conduct of States falling outside of these 
instances of complicity may be captured under the due diligence obligations held 
by States under extant human rights treaties.125  )t is clear that Ǯaid or assistanceǯ is a Ǯnormative and case-specific concept, 
meaning that its content will always have to be determined in the specific 
situation, with a view to the relation between the supportive conduct to the 
neighbouring normative environment and the enabling function it played to the case at hand.ǯ126 This exercise will also need to take into account a second factor 
that will determine the engagement of a complicity rule: the subjective element. 
The manner in which causal act and mens rea interact will require careful 
articulation should a complicity provision be adopted in the proposed treaty, and 
will need to weigh considerations relating to global economic cooperation with 
the need to safeguard fundamental human rights.  
With regard to the mens rea standard, while some form of knowledge on 
behalf of the complicit party is necessary,127 there is presently no agreement 
among scholars as to the level required to engage article 16 ASRIWA.128 
Suggested standards include constructive knowledge (expected in the exercise of 
reasonable care); 129  direct knowledge (based on the particular 
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circumstances);130 wrongful intent (stemming from a reading of the )LCǯs 
Commentary);131 and wilful blindness.132 In the case of wrongful intent, most 
host States engage in bilateral agreements with business actors under the 
auspices of economic development,133 making it difficult to establish intent to 
facilitate any human rights violations resulting from the arrangement.134 Crawford has acknowledged that Ǯdifferent primary rules of international law 
impose different standards ranging from ǲdue diligenceǳ to strict liabilityǯ.135 
Thus, while analogy may take us part way, a complicity provision in a binding 
business and human rights treaty need not necessarily duplicate the level of 
contribution nor the subjective element adopted in the application of article 
16.136  
[D]ue to its generality, it covers aid or assistance furnished to violations of 
the most diverse kind of rules. It therefore cannot be expected that a 
clear-cut general rule on ǲtheǳ intent standard with respect to complicity 
in international law will be deducible.137   
As such, there is no reason as to why a more specific standard may be adopted in 
the treaty as lex specialis.  
Aust even suggests that Ǯa modification of the intent standard may be called for due to differing standards in human rights lawǯ.138 Such was the 
approach of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR) when adopting 
a due diligence standard in Velásquez Rodríguez139 mandating the State to 
organise the government in such a way as to guarantee rights recognised in the 
Convention140 and thus to safeguard its population against the abusive acts of 
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non-State entities conducted with the acquiescence of the host State.141 This 
obliges the State to take positive measures to prevent, investigate and punish 
human rights violations that are not attributable to the State. Yet, the manner in 
which the IACtHR has implemented a lex specialis test in case law where a State 
has supported a non-State actor in violating human rights has proven 
problematic. In Riofrío Massacre 142  and Mapiripán Massacre, 143  the Inter-
American Court and Commission both expressly asserted that support or 
toleration by State officials of human rights abuses by private actors is sufficient 
to attribute those acts to the State. Yet, attribution is arguably superfluous, and 
characteristic of agency rather than complicity. Complicity is a form of secondary 
responsibility, derivative from a principal wrong; it does not entail imputing the 
principal wrong to the secondary actor.  
[R]esponsibility under the Convention may be engaged by the Stateǯs 
failure to ensure the full and free exercise of rights where those rights are 
violated by private parties. There is no need to find that the acts of the 
private party are attributable to the State – the relevant Stateǯs failure to 
act is the attributable act.144  
A better solution would be to recognise the existing due diligence obligations 
incumbent upon States to secure the relevant rights for all within their 
jurisdiction, rather than to loosen the test for attribution.145 
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed enumeration of 
the approaches to mens rea in specific and general complicity provisions.146 
However, it is suggested that setting too low a standard might have overly 
detrimental effects on weak governance States which are incapable of giving 
effect to their international obligations, and may deter FDI and development – 
factors which are of significant concern to many host States in the Global South. While Gibney criticises the )CJǯs interpretation of complicity in Bosnian 
Genocide 147  as setting ǮȋnearlyȌ impossible standardsǯ, 148  it is arguably 
unnecessary to incorporate the lower due diligence standard he endorses into 
human rights complicity, given that there are myriad due diligence obligations 
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relating to the activities of private actors already incumbent upon States. The 
nature of these duties will be explored below. What is clear is that in addition to 
attributional rules enshrined in ASRIWA, some form of primary complicity rule 
may have a place in the rule structure of the proposed business and human 
rights treaty. 
 
C. Due Diligence State Responsibility 
  
Separate to the attribution of a non-State actorǯs conduct to a State, and to the 
substantive complicity rules detailed above, are the due diligence obligations 
mandating States to protect their populations from the adverse effects produced 
by private actors. For instance, article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires State parties to Ǯrespect and ensure to all 
individuals within [their] territory and subject to [their] jurisdiction the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant without distinction of any kindǯ.149 The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) has expressly stated that States will only 
discharge their positive obligations if due diligence150 is exercised in the protection of individuals, Ǯnot just against violations of the Covenant rights by its 
agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entitiesǯ.151  
Similarly, with regard to individual complaints under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, the HRC has attributed breaches to State parties that have 
failed to protect their population from private actors.152 In Lubicon Lake Band v 
Canada,153 the complainants alleged that their land had been expropriated for 
commercial development including oil and gas extraction. The HRC found a 
breach of article 27 ICCPR by the State of Canada. SERAC v Nigeria154 concerned a 
communication to the African Commission for (uman and Peoplesǯ Rights 
regarding environmental degradation resulting from the conduct of a State oil 
company, which serves as majority shareholder in a joint venture with Shell 
Petroleum, among others. While recognising the Ǯwidespread violations 
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perpetrated by the Government of Nigeria and by private actors (be it following its clear blessing or notȌǯ,155 the Commission ultimately affirmed the sole 
responsibility of the Nigerian State.156 Similarly, the responsibility of States to 
protect their citizens from the activities of non-State armed groups are said to arise only Ǯupon the Stateǯs own failure to actǯ.157 Thus, these treaty obligations 
address non-State actors only indirectly, as a consequence of the express consent of the State in which they are domiciled. Yet, to call these obligations Ǯindirectǯ at 
all is problematic. ǮThe phrase ǲindirect obligationǳ actually refers to typical 
obligations binding on States according to the traditional doctrine of international law.ǯ158 
In the context of a business and human rights treaty, a regime of shared 
responsibility is conceivable in which non-State actors bear direct obligations, 
for instance, not to engage in activity which violates the right to life, in addition 
to a separate general obligation on States to act with diligence in protecting their 
populations from the abusive conduct of private parties. It is arguable whether 
the instrument need even provide a restatement of the State obligation, given 
that it is already widely represented in other treaties. This may provide another 
means of drawing a conceptual distinction between wrongful acts, thereby 
circumventing the doctrinal complexities of allocating responsibility between 
multiple actors for the breach of a single primary obligation. )nstead, a Stateǯs 
responsibility might be drawn from the ICCPR, while the non-State actorǯs 
responsibility is drawn from the breach of a primary obligation contained within 
a business and human rights treaty. Such a division of responsibility would 
potentially fill the void between complicit State conduct, and the wilful blindness 
of a State to the conduct of non-State actors operating within their territory. 
 
D. Joint and Several Liability 
 
This final approach is supplementary to the holistic responsibility framework 
outlined above. In the vein of Lauterpacht,159 it draws an analogy from the 
private law notion of joint and several liability, where a State might incur full 
legal responsibility for human rights abuses perpetuated by a non-State actor on 
its territory, and would then bear the onus to seek remediation from the private 
actor in question.160 For Vandenhole, the private law analogy in human rights is a 
surprisingly good fit, since Ǯthe notion of injury to individuals is key to human 
rights responsibility and accountability… [and] the objective of human rights law 
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is to offer reparation to the victimǯ.161 This enumeration arguably oversimplifies 
the human rights project, which is not premised purely on ex post facto redress, 
but also entails ex ante obligations. Emphasising the public law character of international law, Brownlie reminds us that Ǯ[t]he duty to pay compensation is a 
normal consequence of responsibility, but is not conterminous with it.ǯ162 That 
said, the manner in which human rights redress has been managed at the 
domestic level, particularly in relation to business actors, demonstrates the 
significant utility of private law, and thus it should not be written off. 
Vandenholeǯs assertion as to the mixed nature of the international law of 
responsibility finds support in the work of Crawford163 and Nollkaemper.164 
Further, Noyes and Smith, in their prescient ͳͻͺͺ article, provided that Ǯan 
examination of the limited body of decisions, State practice, municipal analogies 
and accepted principles of the international legal system leads to the conclusion 
that significant support exists for the principle of joint and several liability in international lawǯ.165 Alford has also echoed the view of Bruno Simma in the )CJǯs 
Oil Platforms decision166 that a joint and several liability rule can be derived from 
domestic legal systems167 as a general principle of law within the meaning of 
article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.168  
The notion of joint and several liability is visible at the international level 
in the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects.169 States jointly participating in the launch of a space object are to be held Ǯjointly and severally liable for the damage caused.ǯ170 Interestingly, a 
similar provision contemplates wrongdoers acting independently.171 Thus, a 
party injured as a result of the collision of two space objects may claim 
compensation from all or any of the launching States involved. There is no 
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requirement that they act in concert. In determining how responsibility for 
damages will be allocated, article ͶȋʹȌ provides that the burden Ǯshall be 
apportioned between the first two States in accordance to the extent they were 
at fault; if the extent of the fault… cannot be established… compensation shall be apportioned equally between themǯ.172 This approach is advocated by Noyes & 
Smith in advancing a general notion of joint and several liability in international 
law.173 Indeed, international practice has indicated that the liability of States may 
be adjusted to reflect the intervening conduct of non-State actors.174  
While the Space Liability Convention provides an example of the principle 
in operation in international law, this regime only operates between States. A 
more compelling analogy may be drawn from the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), where supervisory obligations are split between sponsoring 
States, and the International Seabed Authority (ISA),175 and private sponsored 
entities are bound by the provisions of internationalised contracts concluded 
with the ISA.176 Particularly interesting is article 139, which provides that ǮStates 
Parties or international organizations acting together shall bear joint and several liabilityǯ for damage resulting from their failure to carry out their 
responsibilities.177 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
Seabed Disputes Chamber has confirmed the application of this principle, stating that it Ǯarises where different entities have contributed to the same damage so that full reparation can be claimed from all or any of them.ǯ178 It is interesting to 
note the Ǯsame damageǯ criterion adopted in article 139 UNCLOS, which departs from the Ǯcommon wrongful actǯ stipulation in article 47 ASRIWA.179 Indeed, the 
Seabed Chamber has confirmed that sponsoring states and international 
organizations need not act in concert;180 they need only contribute to the same 
outcome, a rarity in international law.181  
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Still, the apportionment of responsibility remains problematic.182 Under 
UNCLOS, States and the ISA are burdened with supervisory obligations, while 
private contractors will often carry out the harmful act in question.183 The 
Seabed Chamber has recently concluded that the obligations giving rise to joint 
and several liability between States and the ISA, and the contractual obligations 
of a private actor with the ISA, exist in parallel.184 Thus, under UNCLOS, Ǯno 
regime of joint and several liability of a sponsoring State and a private contractor was said to existǯ185 where a State had taken all measures necessary to ensure 
effective compliance.186 Instead, the liability of the contractor will need to be 
pursued at the domestic level, or brought to the Seabed Chamber by the ISA for 
breach of contract. Yet, Nollkaemper has suggested that there may be 
interpretive room to read in a form of joint and several liability between States 
and non-State actors.187 Though the types of obligations incumbent on each 
entity are arguably distinct, article 22 of annex 3 provides that contractors can be liable for Ǯany damage arising out of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operationsǯ,188 appearing to refer to liability in international law.189  
This possibility notwithstanding, Nollkaemper is keen to caution that the 
decentralised nature of the international legal system will pose procedural 
issues, as will the paucity of courts of compulsory jurisdiction.190 In the absence 
of an expansive reading of article 139, the lack of the joint and several liability of 
the private contractor might also lead to procedural fragmentation, with claims 
against States and the ISA being dealt with at international tribunals, and breach 
of contract claims against private actors being dealt with either at the domestic 
level, or referred to the Seabed Chamber by the ISA.191 Given that sponsoring 
States and the ISA bear the supervisory obligations within UNCLOS, and private 
actors may be held responsible only in relation to claims of breach of contract, it 
is possible that a contractor will be absent from proceedings against a State 
and/or the ISA, despite being vital in determining a causal link between a breach 
of UNCLOS and the ensuing damage.192 Furthermore, exactly how a party which 
has paid reparations to the victim will bring actions against other responsible 
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parties is not clear,193 and as such, the possibility of such an action Ǯremains 
merely theoretical, casting doubt on the principleǯs relevance in international law.ǯ194 Thus, while this regime provides a glimpse at how a system of joint and 
several liability might operate at the international level, questions remain as to 
its precise operation.  
IV. DELIMITING THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF NON-STATE ACTOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
 
The potential framing of the proposed treatyǯs obligations having been examined 
above, questions remain as to their precise content and scope. In this regard, John Ruggieǯs response to the Ecuadorian initiative has been mixed, having 
pragmatically highlighted the diverse legal issues related to the sphere of 
business and human rights.  
[T]he category of business and human rights is not so discrete an issue-
area as to lend itself to a single set of detailed treaty obligations. It 
includes complex clusters of different bodies of national and international law… any attempt to aggregate them into a general business and human 
rights treaty would have to be pitched at such a high level of abstraction 
that it is hard to imagine it providing a basis for meaningful legal 
action.195  
Ruggie has also previously expressed concern that a treaty might set too low a 
ceiling.196 Scholars such as Ramasatry, largely echoing Ruggieǯs apprehensions, 
have drawn analogy from the anti-corruption/bribery movement and instead 
advocated a number of narrower treaties establishing corporate liability for 
specific conduct, particularly in the fields of mineral extraction and illegal 
logging.197 While this middle ground may go some way toward addressing 
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Ruggieǯs concerns, the present Anti-Corruption Convention, while emphasising 
the liability of legal persons,198 is still framed entirely in terms of State 
responsibility.199 
It is unlikely that the form and content of international human rights 
obligations directly addressing business actors could simply mirror those 
presently addressed to States.200 Whereas broadly negative obligations to 
respect human rights may easily lend themselves to application in the corporate 
context, 201  obligations demanding positive action to protect or fulfil the 
realization of human rights may prove more problematic. While scholars have 
cautioned that baseline obligations to respect human rights by refraining from 
various types of activity do not imply as a corollary obligations to advance 
human rights standards,202 the binary separation between positive and negative 
obligations is not particularly helpful in light of the privatization of 
governmental functions.203  
The obligation to respect may encompass a duty to act: in the case of 
private prisons, a duty to guarantee the minimum standards regarding 
conditions of detention… This obligation is conceptually different, 
independent from, and concurrent with the obligation of the State to 
protect the rights of inmates by establishing an effective regulatory 
system regarding the privatization of prisons and guaranteeing judicial 
remedies for human rights violations.204  
The same may be said with regard to economic social and cultural rights such as 
the rights to health, food and water, which are often impacted by the disastrous 
environmental effects of corporate operations.205  While these rights have 
classically been framed as positive duties on States demanding their progressive 
realization via the allocation of appropriate funding and infrastructure, the 
dichotomy between positive and negative rights has been exposed as excessively 
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reductive.206 These same rights could be represented within a business and 
human rights treaty in a manner that respects the differential scope of the duties 
of States and non-State actors. For instance, an obligation to refrain from the use 
of land and resources in a manner that is detrimental to the health, 
environmental, land and cultural rights of populations would tailor the content 
of these rights to the corporate context. While such an obligation may imply a 
positive duty to carry out appropriate risk assessments, such demands are hardly 
unduly restrictive, and are already codified within existing soft-law regimes.207 
A second factor that must be contended with is that of scope. The 
responsibility of a State to respect, protect and fulfil existing human rights 
standards is delineated by a spatial dimension, that of its jurisdiction.208 The 
notion of jurisdiction in international human rights law has classically been 
conceived as primarily territorial in nature.209 Since business actors do not 
possess permanent sovereignty or territorial control in the same manner as a 
State, or even a non-State armed group,210 some other factor will be required in 
order to determine the limits of corporate responsibility.  
At one end is the approach that tends towards an abstract test, 
independent of the particular act or omission in question, like the overall or effective control tests… or sphere of influence or proximity tests. At the 
other end is a contextual and inductive approach that… [focuses] on 
actual or potential use of power or activity, and its effects or impact on 
rights-holders.211 
The first matter that must be considered is the nature of the obligation. 
This is linked to the forgoing discussion of primary and secondary rules, which 
identified that there is scope to establish two sets of primary obligations within 
the proposed treaty: one which deems a principal violation wrongful, and a 
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second which deems complicity in that principal wrong to engage an actorǯs 
responsibility. Ratner has suggested that where a corporation breaches a complicity obligation Ǯthe factor of the nexus to the affected populations drops outǯ.212 In effect, the delimitation of the obligation is derived from the breach of 
the principal wrong by a State actor. While this enumeration does not account 
for a scenario in which a corporation is deemed to be the principal wrongdoer 
with the aid or assistance of a State, it could be argued that in most scenarios the Stateǯs responsibility would be captured under its general due diligence 
obligations. Ratner continues: 
Second is a set of duties on the corporation not to infringe directly on the 
human rights of those with whom it enjoys certain ties, with the 
possibility of greater duties depending upon the scope of those links… 
These connections may, for example, emanate from legal ties (as with 
employees), physical proximity, or possession of de facto control over a 
piece of territory.213 
While such an approach seems reasonable, the precise shape of these 
tests remains unclear. Proximity may imply political or economic ties, or may be 
circumscribed by geography, a notion which Ruggie describes as Ǯmisleading… 
[companies] can equally affect the rights of people far away from the sourceǯ.214 While Ǯlegal tiesǯ with employees seems to be the simplest measure, given the 
sprawling corporate structures exhibited by many multinational enterprises,215 
the question is how far Ǯlegal tiesǯ will go. Will they stretch down the entire 
supply chain to reach contractors and sub-contractors of subsidiary 
corporations? It would seem unlikely in light of domestic tort litigation, a Dutch 
Court having recently held that  
proximity between [a] parent company and the employees of its 
subsidiary that operates in the same country cannot be unreservedly 
equated with the proximity between the parent of an international group 
of oil companies and the [population] in the vicinity… of its [foreign] 
subsidiaries.216  
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It was on this basis that the Dutch Court distinguished the case before it from the 
landmark Chandler v Cape judgment, which recognised that, in limited 
circumstances, parents may be held responsible for the overseas operations of 
their subsidiaries. 217 While an appeal is pending before the Dutch Courts 
following a ruling that company documents previously denied to the plaintiffs 
should be disclosed, the final outcome of the case remains uncertain.218 ǮProcedural defencesǯ of this kind are often invoked by business actors in 
domestic litigation in order to avoid liability, and might also factor into the 
enforcement of international obligations.219 Whether parent companies alone, 
where the majority of a businessǯs assets lies, ought to be targeted primarily for 
their lack of oversight, or other entities further down the supply chain should be 
indicted, is another question feeding into the debate as to the scope of the treaty. 
Should the instrument target only companies operating transnationally, or 
should it be broader in scope?220  
The principle of Ǯdue diligenceǯ is another delimiting standard that is key 
to operationalizing the UNGPs.221 Principle 17(a) advises that the concept covers Ǯadverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or 
contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationshipsǯ. 222  The 
commentary to this principle provides that Ǯ[w]here business enterprises have 
large numbers of entities in their value chains it may be unreasonably difficult to conduct due diligence for adverse human rights impacts across them all.ǯ223 If 
adopted by the proposed treaty, such a loose delimitation of the scope of the 
obligations would arguably give rise to procedural issues in establishing a breach 
in situations involving multinational conglomerates. Others have emphasised the 
responsibility of actors for human rights to the extent that they fall within their 
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Ǯsphere of influenceǯ, a notion that gained traction during the drafting of the 
ultimately abandoned 2003 Draft Norms on Transnational Corporations. The 
concept has been described as a Ǯset of concentric circles, mapping stakeholders in a companyǯs value chainǯ.224 Ruggie has been critical of the treatment of this term as Ǯfunctionally equivalent to a Stateǯs jurisdictionǯ, warning against the 
ambiguity of the term, which might invite manipulation from States seeking to 
avoid their own human rights responsibility.225  
Karavias has also cautioned against the adoption of this standard in 
determining the scope of human rights obligations. )rrespective of whether we term it ǲjurisdictionǳ or ǲsphere of influenceǳ, 
the root of human rights obligations is the existence of a factual situation, namely control… Corporations, unlike States, do not in principle exercise control over territory… Still, corporations may exercise functional control 
over persons.226  
It has been suggested that the control standard is essentially Ǯa short hand for something that looks surprisingly like sovereignty.ǯ227 The approach has been 
elaborated by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights dealing 
with the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases arising from the 2003 
Iraq conflict.228 The Court has recognised that jurisdiction may be established by 
States exercising control over persons, premises, territory or vessels. 229 
Interestingly, it has not limited the notion of personal jurisdiction to individuals 
detained in physical custody, and has recognised that the use of force may, in 
some circumstances, amount to an assertion of jurisdiction.230 That said, the 
Court has been notoriously inconsistent in its justifications for the establishment 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction,231 and as such may not be the best indicator of 
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accepted doctrine.232 Precisely what constitutes Ǯcontrolǯ or Ǯforceǯ, and whether 
such principles would cover conduct giving rise to widespread environmental 
devastation is perhaps open to question.  The exact scope of the causal link 
required will demand further analysis. While mere corporate presence in a State 
in which human rights abuses take place is probably not sufficient to establish a 
link, Ǯwhere a State perpetrates human rights violations with a view to luring 
corporate investment, one may argue that corporate investors retain some sort of ǲindirectǳ control over the aggrieved individualsǯ.233 Given that this form of 
jurisdictional link has not yet crystallized in relation to the conduct of States and 
their agents, no firm conclusions can be drawn on this matter. Yet, in the context 
of the alternatives explored above, the control criterion advocated by scholars 
such as Ratner and Karavias is perhaps the most pragmatic. 
V. REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  
The nature of the adjudication and enforcement of the proposed treaty regime 
presents a complex set of questions, the answers to which are conditional upon 
the type of remedy pursued. Ex ante measures embedded within human rights treaty regimes are Ǯforward-lookingǯ, in that they seek the prevention and 
management of harm arising from adverse human rights impacts.234 This type of 
mechanism is pre-emptive, seeking to deter non-compliance through periodic 
monitoring and engagement with relevant duty-bearers. The question arises as 
to whether a treaty monitoring body tasked with ex ante duties in monitoring 
periodic reports from relevant duty-holders might play a part in the proposed 
regime. Ruggie has suggested that difficulties would be faced were such a 
mechanism to be established, given that many vulnerable weak governance 
States may be incapable of meaningfully engaging with reporting requirements. On the other hand, Ǯif reporting was to be done by companies directly, then presumably States would have to enforce the obligation upon them… (ow a treaty body would cope with the incalculably large universe of businesses… is unclearǯ. 235 Some treaty monitoring bodies also perform quasi-judicial roles in 
the consideration of individual complaints brought against signatory States, 
permitting further interpretation of human rights standards and the rendering of 
recommendations to State parties regarding ex post facto remedies. The benefits 
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of these types of decision in the further codification of human rights standards 
notwithstanding, their non-binding status and the poor record of State 
implementation and enforcement of these decisions does not lend confidence to 
their efficacy in compensating the harms suffered by victims.236 Other treaty 
regimes demand regular visits to relevant sites by independent bodies in order 
to monitor the implementation of human rights standards.237 Clearly, ex ante 
enforcement mechanisms and ex post facto remedies are complementary in the 
field of human rights, and the proposed regime would ideally need to tailor both 
to the business and human rights context. Whether this could be achieved solely 
by the establishment of a treaty monitoring body is doubtful, though it may be 
the most pragmatic, in that it might permit individual complaints against States 
and non-State actors, leading to recommendations that States pursue binding 
domestic litigation against business actors to ensure remediation for victims. 
The weakness of international enforcement mechanisms more generally 
remains an oft-cited criticism of the international legal system, and the dialogue 
surrounding the establishment of a business and human rights treaty 
exacerbates such concerns. At present, international courts do not possess 
jurisdiction over business actors, the involvement of non-State actors in 
adjudicative procedures having been largely constrained to the submission of 
amicus curiae briefs.238 It is clear in the statement submitted by Ecuador that 
avenues for redress ought to be provided under the binding regulatory 
framework proposed. Ruggie has also stressed the need for elaboration as to 
whether such enforcement would take place at the domestic level, where it 
would be vulnerable to many procedural flaws experienced in weak governance 
States, or whether an Ǯinternational court for corporationsǯ should be 
established.239 It is worth briefly considering how such a court might function. 
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Scholars advocating the international criminal responsibility of non-State 
entities240 have highlighted the recourse made to juridical persons during the 
drafting of the Statute of Rome 1998.241 While one draft expressly provided the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the competence to render a judgment 
over legal persons Ǯwhen the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agenciesǯ, the provision was ultimately omitted.242  
Nonetheless, Clapham has emphasised that this resulted from a lack of time 
during the late stages of the drafting process, rather than objections from 
representatives.243 While commentators have suggested that jurisdiction over 
legal persons could be affirmed in the future,244 the ICC has not pursued such 
measures. Indeed, the expansion of the )CCǯs mandate in this manner could create even more political opposition to the Courtǯs very existence.245 Other 
objections have emphasised the need for complementarity between national and 
international spheres,246 and the inherent difficulties in establishing the actus 
reus247 and mens rea of corporate entities.248 
While the first ICC prosecutor was likely correct when he remarked, Ǯ[f]ollow the trail of the money and you will find the criminalsǯ,249 given the 
complex corporate structures boasted by many business actors, the difficulty in 
pinpointing specific individuals to bear criminal responsibility will be significant. )t has been suggested that Ǯcommand responsibility,ǯ which applies to crimes 
committed by subordinates operating under the effective control of a 
superior,250 offers an avenue to expose company directors to international 
criminal liability.251 While most often utilized to establish responsibility in 
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military command chains, the jurisprudence of the ICTR reflects the conviction of 
company directors for the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity on 
this basis.252 Yet, such avenues are not appropriate to fill the accountability gap 
with regard to business actors, in that ex post facto redress is not the only 
purpose of the human rights regime. Moreover, only a limited range of offences 
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Any suggestion that its competences could 
be expanded in the future253 is countered by the limitation of its jurisdiction to Ǯthe most serious crimes of concern to the international communityǯ.254 As Chiomenti suggests, Ǯ[i]t is difficult to imagine that, except in extreme circumstances… a corporation ordinarily operating in the industrial, commercial, 
or services sector, will act as the principal author to commit any of the crimes 
falling under the jurisdiction of the ICCǯ.255  
A draft statute for a World Court of Human Rights possessing jurisdiction 
over non-State actors has been developed by Nowak and Kozma.256 Practitioners 
such as Cronstedt have also discussed the potential structure of an International 
Tribunal on Business and Human Rights.257 Such an institution would not issue 
legally binding decisions, but would rely entirely on the concern of business 
actors regarding their corporate image.258 Unfortunately, these drafts make the 
standing of non-State actors before the proposed arbitral bodies contingent upon 
a declaration of their consent,259 a factor which is rendered entirely unnecessary 
from the formalist theoretical perspective advanced above. Indeed, an analogy 
might be drawn from the Seabed Disputes Chamber that has jurisdiction over 
States, the ISA, as well as natural and juridical persons, Ǯa significant departure 
from the general regime that confines jurisdiction rationae personae to States and international organizationsǯ. 260  However, scholars such as Boyle and 
Harrison have been reticent concerning the idea of a specialised international 
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environmental court, on the basis of the sheer variety of laws relevant to 
environmental disputes. The judges of such a court would require a wide-
ranging grasp of international law, rendering them no different, in effect, to those 
at the ICJ.261 Given the strong parallels between environmental degradation and 
the operations of multinational enterprises, similar practical concerns could be 
expressed in relation to a World Court on Business and Human Rights. 
Assuming it is possible to establish a judicial body capable of hearing 
claims against States and non-State actors, its task in apportioning responsibility 
for fulfilment of the remedial damages among multiple perpetrators would 
doubtless prove highly complex. Consider the event that separate primary 
obligations for both direct and complicit breaches were drafted, in line with the 
approach considered above in Section III. Drawing an analogy from the scheme 
underpinning reparations in ASRIWA, it must first be established that the wrongful acts in question each have a direct causal connection to the victimǯs 
injury.262 Once satisfied, at least 2 distinct situations are possible. The conduct of 
multiple actors either gives rise to: i) separate wrongful acts contributing to a 
single injury; or ii) separate wrongful acts contributing to multiple separate 
injuries. In the first situation, a business actor might breach an international 
obligation by engaging in torture, and a State may breach a second obligation by 
engaging in complicit conduct. Thus, two distinct but nonetheless 
complementary breaches are inseparably linked to the victimǯs injury. DǯArgent 
suggests that there are two ways to deal with reparations in such a situation; 
either one wrongful act is identified and isolated as the decisive cause, and a 
single party is held liable for the entire sum of damages, or all parties are held to 
be jointly and severally liable for full reparation.263 This analysis demonstrates 
the interrelationship between the tiers of the rule structure proposed above. 
While the approach of joint and several liability seems preferable from the victimǯs perspective, it raises the question of how responsible actors might seek 
redress for contributions to the harmful outcome by their co-perpetrators. 
Whether claims could play out between States and non-State actors domestically 
is questionable, given the unwillingness or incapacity of many States to give 
domestic effect to their international human rights obligations in the first place. 
The position is arguably more straightforward in the second situation, 
where separate breaches give rise to separate (though potentially related) 
injuries. Consider the scenario in which a State and a business actor separately 
engage in torture. DǯArgent suggests that in this situation, Ǯthe responsibility of 
each wrongdoer can be separately invoked to the extent of the causal importance 
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of its own wrongful act in relation to the [overall] injuryǯ.264 The simplification 
arising from the distinct nature of the injuries notwithstanding, Ǯthe 
apportionment of the obligation to make reparation in situations of 
complementary causal wrongful acts is far from being so… such a solution can only be implemented on a case by case basisǯ.265 In addition, there are 
necessarily shades of grey that arise between these two extremes, further 
exacerbating hurdles to the achievement of an adequate remedy for victims. 
A final procedural matter relates to the enforcement of the remedy once a 
ruling has been issued. While it may be argued that there is some value in the 
rendering of a judgment by a court or quasi-judicial body even in the absence of 
power to enforce the implementation of decisions, the assurance of actual 
compliance is also desirable. Given that the decisions rendered by a ǮWorld Courtǯ are likely to refer to corporate activity occurring within the territory of Ǯhostǯ States, the adoption of appropriate domestic responses will likely fall to 
the very weak governance States that are unwilling or unable to provide initial 
safeguards. Poor compliance may also arise in light of the desires of more 
economically powerful States to protect their corporate nationals.266 Significant 
cooperation would be required on the part of developing Ǯhostǯ States and Western Ǯhomeǯ States in order to curtail corporate abuses,267 a position that is 
undeniably optimistic. 268  Thus, while the formalist theoretical approach 
advanced above permits States to realise a binding treaty and accord Ǯsupranational competences to an overarching body… the growth of 
international cooperation is a slow process because States would generally be hesitant to reduce the legal freedoms they enjoy.ǯ269 These are important realist 
factors that hamper the implementation of the proposed treaty regime. While 
there is nothing theoretically preventing the extension of rights and duties to 
non-State actors in theory, the willingness of States, who remain the primary 
legislators and are substantially economically dependent on multinationals for 
employment and capital, is not guaranteed. Yet, it is useful to bear in mind Paineǯs optimistic retort: 
True, we need to be cognizant that the powerful will retain the ability to 
act contrary to existing law, but… legal validity… can offer a useful 
medium for critiquing the actions of the powerful and should not be given 
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up too quickly, even when confronted with the ability of the powerful to 
displace existing law.270  
It is submitted that the manner in which the issue of non-State actor regulation is 
framed theoretically may have profound consequences on its practical operation. 
This much is evident in the subsisting State-centric operation of public 
international law. As such, it is argued that there is significant utility in 
establishing more robust theoretical foundations, even in the absence of an 
effective enforcement mechanism, since this may provide the groundwork for 
future normative development.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The forgoing analysis demonstrates the doctrinal complexities that must be 
contended with in order to advance public international law in the direction of 
direct non-State actor regulation. While there are no simple answers in assessing 
the feasibility of a business and human rights treaty, some preliminary 
conclusions may be drawn in at least two of the four substantive areas 
addressed. It has been demonstrated that some shift is required in the manner in 
which international obligations are theoretically conceptualized in order to build 
a convincing case that business actors serve as direct addressees. Classical State-
centric scholarship has relied on a contractarian underpinning that has proven 
to be methodologically flawed, incapable of responding to shifting power 
dynamics, and has sustained specious sensitivities in political and legal doctrine. 
This article has argued that the adoption of a formalist understanding of 
international legal personality can circumvent many of these anxieties, and 
instead advance a more logical foundation that is receptive to direct non-State 
actor regulation.  
A second observation that can be drawn concerns the identification of 
duty-bearers, and the allocation of responsibility. Given the traditionally bi-
lateral scope of international responsibility, its apportionment between multiple 
parties for their contributions to the same harmful outcome has given rise to 
significant debate over the last decade. If the proposed treaty is to move beyond 
the imposition of State-centric obligations, then the attribution model of State 
responsibility falls short of establishing a robust system of allocation. The model 
advanced above suggests that the attribution of offending conduct to States 
would need to be supplemented by complicity and due diligence provisions in 
order that responsibility might be assigned to multiple actors, in appropriate 
proportions. By viewing complicity provisions as a form of primary rule, it is 
possible to circumvent the hurdles that would be encountered in attempting to 
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allocate responsibility for a single wrongful act. State conduct that does not meet 
the complicity threshold could also be captured by due diligence obligations 
within existing treaties. In adopting a holistic approach of this kind that 
incorporates extant international responsibility regimes, it is possible to draw a 
conceptual distinction between the distinct wrongful acts of multiple 
perpetrators. This in turn might aid assessments of the causal contributions of 
multiple actors in the implementation of a system of remediation framed in 
terms of joint and several liability. These virtues notwithstanding, whether this 
model would prove too complex to secure practical implementation remains a 
concern.  
The path becomes more obscure in relation to the final two sections of the 
article, which addressed the delimitation of international obligations addressing 
business actors, and modes of enforcement. While an analogy may be drawn 
with principles such as Ǯdue diligenceǯ, the corporate Ǯsphere of influenceǯ in 
established soft-law initiatives, or the notion of Ǯcontrolǯ that has gained traction 
in jurisprudence relating to the extraterritorial obligations of States, the precise 
way forward is unclear. While the latter approach appears to be the most 
pragmatic, practice has not settled in relation to States, let alone non-State 
entities. This is clearly a matter of fundamental importance to the success of a 
treaty addressing business actors, and must be subjected to further scrutiny. It 
has been suggested that the determination of the scope of obligations is as much 
to do with policy as legal doctrine, and as such, arguments relating to the 
ideology of the free-market are likely to curtail efforts to formulate duties owed 
by corporations to all individuals their activities touch and concern.  
With regard to the grant of remedies and their enforcement, it is unlikely 
that the domestic courts of weak governance States could provide the procedural 
guarantees required to administer decisions, and short of an amendment to their 
constituent documents, existing international courts are presently incapable of 
accommodating claims relating to corporate non-State actors. While a court or 
tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction and the competence to hear joint and 
several liability claims concerning contributions to the Ǯsame damageǯ is perhaps 
the preferred option, the complex nature of the multi-party disputes, which are 
likely to engage numerous treaties, will doubtless prove to be a major 
impediment. Thus, while there is little that cannot be overcome in terms of legal 
theory and doctrine given the requisite political will, it is the practical realization 
of a binding business and human rights regime that will likely prove to be the 
complicating factor. History dictates that the establishment of treaty regimes can 
crystallise over time into highly advanced institutionalized systems, evidenced 
by the extant State-centric human rights framework. It is submitted that there is 
inherent value in attempting to solve doctrinal dilemmas surrounding the 
proposed treaty in the short term, in that this process will fortify legal 
scholarship as a vehicle for the immanent critique of the abusive acts of both 
State and non-State actors. As we stand at the foothills of a legally binding 
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framework addressing business actors, the task is to keep asking the difficult 
questions, and to resist dejection by the terrain which impedes the summit. 
